In theory, decentralized vote trading in power-sharing systems promotes: a) efficiency, by assigning greater decision-making power to individuals that care a lot about the election's outcome, and b) dispersion of benefits, since even individuals that have little interest about the electoral result can profit by selling their votes. We experimentally test these intuitions in the laboratory and find that, indeed, allowing real subjects to trade votes for money in such systems increases collective welfare, and substantially redistributes it towards those that are less concerned about the election. Importantly, these findings hold true under alternative trading institutions, thus, reinforcing their empirical relevance.
Introduction
Trade to take place, requires that all participating entities are benefited from it. Hence, it goes without saying that a society whose members are endowed with amounts of certain private consumption commodities, only has to gain by allowing its members to trade. In this way, individuals who lack a certain good that they would enjoy consuming, but possess another good about which they do not really care, can trade with individuals that possess it but who do not greatly value it. Importantly, everybody ends up better off than with no trade, and hence it is relatively safe to claim that trade unambiguously improves collective welfare.
Unfortunately, this positive feature of trade does not easily generalize to circumstances where the traded goods are not exclusively private consumption commodities, but ones that involve externalities; like emissions' permits, fishing rights, or votes. Indeed, the claim that all members of the society enjoy larger utility if trade is allowed than if it is not, relies on the simple observation that, when trade is allowed and all commodities are of private-consumption nature, each individual can enjoy at least the same utility level as with no trade, since being actively involved in trade is voluntary. This is not true when the trade of certain goods induces externalities to non-traders.
Consider for instance a society which allows its members to trade votes before elections. A particular individual may abstain from vote trading, but her utility level will be crucially affected by the decisions of the vote traders, since their trading decisions will largely shape the electoral outcome. Yet, these results are specific to elections between two candidates under majority rule. Undeniably, decisions that are taken by simple majority are at the core of the formal study of democratic institutions and of great empirical relevance since many real elections fit this description. However, this is not the unique kind of elections that are relevant. In many occasions collective entities employ the, so-called, power-sharing institutions 2 to make certain important decisions, especially as far as the composition of multi-member bodies are concerned (e.g., councils, executive boards). For instance, in most parliamentary democracies, the composition of the legislature follows proportional 1 See, for example, Riker and Brams (1973) , Piketty (1994) . 2 The literature on the topic was initiated by Lijphart (1984) . Some standard references include Austen-Smith and Banks (1988), Ortuño-Ortín (1997), Grossman and Helpman (1999) , Alesina and Rosenthal (2000) , Baron and Diermeier (2001) , Morelli (2004) , Llavador (2006) , Sahuguet electoral systems that attribute more parliament seats to parties that receive larger vote shares.
Moreover, in many local elections different party lists are assigned public offices in proportion to the share of votes that they received. Hence, it is important to know whether vote trading has the same detrimental effects in these systems too. 3 In this paper, we argue that vote trading before elections in power-sharing systems is, in theory, welfare improving. This is not an aggregate phenomenon, but actually works at the individual level:
every player, independently of how much she cares about the election's outcome, expects higher utility when vote trading is allowed than when it is not. 4 This salient difference compared to simple majority frameworks is mainly due to the fact that in power-sharing systems externalities from vote trading can vanish in expectation. Consider a two-party setup where every voter is known to be the supporter of each party with even probability. Then, if all players use symmetric strategies, the expected vote share -the aggregate outcome that determines each individual's utility level in power-sharing systems -of the preferred party of a certain player does not vary in the distribution of votes that follows the vote-trading stage. That is, the player always expects that her preferred party will receive her vote and half of the rest of the votes. Indeed, independently of who holds a vote, as long as I do not hold it, I expect that it will be given to my preferred party with probability 1/2.
Additionally, vote trading in such systems exhibits a redistributive effect on the relative expected utilities: individuals who do not care a lot about the election's result profit substantially by vote trading, while players who do care a lot do not always benefit as much.
These effects of vote trading in power-sharing systems are robust to a variety of different assumptions regarding the rules of vote trading -including strategic and price-taking environments. But are they pertinent to real elections? That is, should we consider allowing voters to trade votes for money in real power-sharing systems? Many theoretical analyses generate predictions that require unrealistically sophisticated reasoning on behalf of the subjects, and hence fail to be validated in contexts of empirical interest. Are the above arguments a mere theoretical artifact, or do they also 3 Xefteris and Ziros (2017) derived some first results by studying a specific trading mechanism in such systems. To our knowledge, though, there is still no general argument that applies across different trading institutions and generates clear predictions regarding the effects of vote trading on collective welfare. 4 We construct our formal argument considering the setup in which vote trading is most usually studied, namely, when two parties participate in the election and individual preferences are the voters' private information (see, e.g., Casella, Llorente-Saguer and Palfrey, 2012; Casella and Turban, 2014; Casella, Palfrey, and Turban, 2014; and Xefteris and Ziros, 2017).
carry practical implications? In light of the obvious importance of these questions, especially as far as policy design is concerned, we regard that their empirical testing is imperative. This is the main task that we undertake in this paper.
We conduct a laboratory investigation using both strategic and price-taking vote-trading institutions in a power-sharing electoral system and we pin down the effect of vote trading on collective welfare and on welfare distribution. Our results indicate that indeed collective welfare is larger when trading votes for money is allowed before an election, across all considered trading rules. This welfare improvement is statistically significant at any conventional level, but relatively moderate in magnitude -vote trading before elections increases election-related payoffs by about 3% -while the redistributive effect is significant both in statistical and in economic terms: We identify a striking 25%-50% increase (depending on the treatment) in the election-related payoffs of the voters that care the least about the election's outcome, and mild or no welfare increases to voters that care about the election in an intermediate or significant manner.
However, these positive results do not come without additional caveats. A regular finding in our experiments is that the demand for votes is higher than expected in equilibrium. When the trading mechanism hinders prices from becoming very high, this tendency does not cause inefficiencies.
When the mechanism, though, allows very high prices, we observe a negative effect of vote trading on the payoffs of individuals that care a lot about the election's outcome. On average this negative effect is smaller compared to the positive effect of vote trading on the payoffs of individuals that do not care a lot about the election's outcome, so even in such instances vote trading does not reduce collective welfare. Nevertheless, it is still a departure from the theoretical result that vote trading in power-sharing systems unambiguously improves the welfare of all individuals, and makes clear that the features of the trading mechanism in place determine the size and the distribution of benefits from vote trading crucially.
These main findings of our work indicate that allowing for vote trading should be considered -with caution -as a serious option to improve the quality of collective decisions in setups in which sharing of power is desired. Of course, one should be very careful when drawing inference from a controlled experimental framework in order to understand real life contexts, but still the experimental approach is a necessary step closer to the goal compared to solely theoretical findings.
Indeed, further experimental studies and approaches are necessary so that confidence on these results is strengthened. Field experiments would be a natural next step, but these first welfare results, arguably, lay a promising groundwork.
Apart from welfare, our experimental study also sheds light on a number of other interesting aspects of vote trading. Notice that allowing voters to trade before elections does not mean that voters will actually decide to sell/buy votes. In all theoretical frameworks considered here, notrade is always a plausible eventuality. Indeed, if nobody is expected to trade then nobody has incentives to offer or demand votes, and hence no-trade is always an equilibrium. Moreover, real subjects might have moral objections with respect to vote trading and this makes it a real question whether human subjects will actually engage in trading their votes for money. We find that in an overwhelming 82% of cases trade actually took place (i.e., there was at least one seller and at least one buyer). 5 This establishes that individuals most probably choose to trade when it is allowed to, ensuring efficiency gains. Moreover, the volume of traded votes, demand and supply are shown to react in the expected manner when parameters of the trading environment change, thus, validating the relevance of the main welfare results (i.e., it is very hard to argue that they are generated by other, non-economic, forces when all the remaining economically relevant variables behave in the expected manner).
Providing results both for strategic and for price-taking trading institutions is vital for establishing generality of the obtained results. In the literature the two main ways to model exchanges in presence of externalities is the traditional price-taking framework, 6 in which individuals face a fixed price, and the strategic context, 7 in which price is expected to be determined by the decisions of all individuals. Evidently, there is a great variety of particular trading environments that fit in these two broad classes and, thus, it is not possible to test all of them. We have opted though to investigate two simple setups, each belonging to one of the described big classes, which arguably 5 In all our experiments the theoretical prediction regarding the probability that vote trading actually takes place in a given round is about 86%, which is quite similar to the observed frequency. 6 See, for instance, Arrow and Hahn (1971) , Shafer and Sonnenschein (1975) , Hammond (1998) , Florenzano (2003) , del Mercato (2006) , and Bonnisseau and del Mercato (2010).
7 Specifically in this paper we use the strategic market game context, originating in Shubik, (1973), Shapley and Shubik (1977) . Certainly these games are not the only ones that could be used, but their explicit trading rules makes them attractive for our purpose. For some standard references see Dubey and Shubik (1978) , Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1978) capture the main differences between the strategic and the price-taking approach, and hence allow us to interpret our findings more broadly.
In what follows we discuss the relevant literature (Section 2), we develop the general theoretical argument and detail the particular strategic and price-taking mechanisms that we will employ in the experiment (Section 3), we present our experimental setup (Section 4), our results (Section 5), and, finally, we conclude with some ideas regarding further investigations (Section 6). All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
Relevant literature
The literature on vote trading before elections is not recent. Many scholars have debated the idea, since the endeavour to improve the quality of collective decision making is traditionally one of the main goals of economic theory. also showed that vote trading had the predicted effects on social welfare, since with decentralized markets there were too many minority wins, whereas with trade through group leaders there were too few minority wins.
Our main goal is to complement these studies by studying similar questions in power-sharing systems, and hence, to provide a round and complete understanding regarding the comparative effects of vote trading across varying political institutions. 
Theoretical arguments
We consider a simplified model of vote trading before an election in a power-sharing system. In particular, we consider a community with N = {1, 2, ..., n} individuals and two parties, A and B.
All individuals are identical with respect to their initial endowments, each individual is assumed to have one vote and e units of money (numeraire).
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Preferences and beliefs Concerning preferences, each individual i ∈ N is characterized by her ordinal preferences' type, t i ∈ {A, B}, where t i = A if A i B and t i = B if B i A and her cardinal preferences' type, represented by the intensity parameter w i ∈ + . Hence, the overall type 9 Let us also mention that there are various experimental approaches to vote trading in plurality rule elections that do not adopt the vote-market framework. For instance, McKelvey and Ordeshook (1980) used "votes for votes" exchanges in various scenarios in order to test whether subjects are able to coordinate towards Pareto efficient outcomes or outcomes offered by alternative cooperative solution concepts. More recenlty, Goeree and Zhang (2017) employed auction-type mechanisms -theoretically studied also by Lalley and Weyl (2014), Lalley and Weyl (2018) , and Eguia and Xefteris (2018) -and showed that bidding for votes yields higher overall welfare and is particularly beneficial to moderate voters due to the redistribution of gains.
Of course, this is not the only class of experiments in political economics. Vote-related decisions in alternative contexts have been studied, for instance, by Levine 10 It should be noted that the choice of the initial amount of the numeraire does not affect in any way the analysis, since in this literature preferences over money are considered to be linear and there are no budget constraints (i.e., final monetary allocations can be negative). Moreover, it will become evident below, that in any equilibrium the final monetary allocation of an individual cannot be too low, since individuals have the option of keeping their initial endowments. 
In the first stage individuals face a common strategy set X = { } ∪X = {x 1 , x 2 , ..., x k } for some k 0, where stands for the refrain-from-trade option (i.e., if a player i selects , then,
independently of what the other players choose) andX for the set of the votetrading options; and a symmetric allocation rule Q k,n : X n → ∆Ω, where ∆Ω is the set of lotteries over Ω. By symmetric we mean that if x ∈ X n is a permutation of x ∈ X n such that x i = x j for some pair (i, j) ∈ N 2 , then i ends up with y in x with the same probability that j ends up with y in x , for every y ∈ Y . The pair (X, Q (#X−1),n ) is called a vote-trading institution. Hence, vote trading is decentralized -the allocations of votes and money follow endogenously from the players' decisions -and regulated -the permitted actions and their consequences follow a specific vote-trading institution.
Voting stage In the second stage each voter attributes the votes to any party she decides to.
Payoffs In the third stage players' payoffs are computed. In particular, if we denote by V t i the total number of votes that the preferred party of individual i receives, then the payoff of this individual is
Since players' behavior is unambiguous in the voting stage, we do not model it formally and simply assume that each voter attributes all her votes to the party she prefers. This essentially leaves us with an ex-ante symmetric single stage game of incomplete information -characterized by the vote-trading institution (X, Q (#X−1),n ) -and, hence, the natural equilibrium concept is Bayesian Nash equilibrium in symmetric strategies (i.e., two players may choose different actions only if their cardinal preferences' types are different).
We now state our general result.
Theorem 1 (i) For every admissible vote-trading institution, any equilibrium with vote trading assigns to every player of every type at least as high expected utility as the no-trade equilibrium (which always exists).
(ii) There exist admissible vote-trading institutions that support equilibria such that almost all types of all players enjoy a strictly higher expected utility compared to no-trade.
This theorem is very strong as it essentially dictates that as long as vote trading is voluntary
and subjects have the option to refrain from trade, it cannot lead to welfare inferior outcomes in power-sharing systems. Moreover, it reassures us that the set of institutions for which it admits strictly welfare improving vote-trading equilibria is not empty. We observe, though, that no-trade (i.e., the action profile in which each player selects ) is always an equilibrium. In other words, allowing for vote trading does not automatically mean that welfare improvements will be reached, since agents might coordinate in the no-trade equilibrium.
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Importantly, the welfare improving finding holds in the individual level: There are no types of any player that are worse off in an equilibrium that involves trade compared to the no-trade equilibrium. Moreover, if a player i expects the rest of the voters to employ , then -by assumption
independently of what she will choose. Hence, coordinating to an equilibrium with active vote trading is superior for everybody and safe -in the sense that, if all other players coordinate to no-trade, one does not lose anything by choosing to trade. The simplicity of the arguments these welfare claims are based on, hints that they might not only be relevant from a theory point of view, but also of empirical interest. For this reason we directly proceed to the statement of the first hypotheses whose validity we will test subsequently in the laboratory.
11 While the arguments supporting this theorem utilize the assumption that ordinal preferences are assigned with even probability, it can been shown -at least, in the framework of particular trading environments -that the positive effect of vote buying on expected payoffs persists in asymmetric setups too. 
Vote-trading institutions
Despite the apparent game-theoretic nature of our model, as we will see below, its assumptions are so broad that they nest both sophisticated -in which the optimal action of a player depends crucially on the expected behavior of the rest of the voters -and simple -in which the optimal action of a player does not depend on the expected behavior of the rest of the players -vote-trading environments. In the literature that studies decentralized markets, a main difference between pricetaking and strategic trading environments -at least as far as the required cognitive operations of the involved individuals are concerned -lies in the fact that when prices are fixed, individuals make decisions that are less dependent on the choices (and, hence, on their beliefs regarding the choices) of their fellow citizens; while in the strategic frameworks, an individual's optimal choice always depends heavily on the expected decisions of the rest of the society. Formally, we consider that (X, Q P #(X−1),n ) is a price-taking institution if for every type of every player, the intersection of the set of best responses withX remains constant for all possible beliefs. On the contrary, (X, Q S #(X−1),n ) is a strategic institution if for some type of some player, the intersection of the set of best responses withX is not constant across all possible beliefs.
Before proceeding with our experiment let us describe the particular strategic and the pricetaking mechanisms that we have employed. There are also a few interesting points that should be stressed here about our strategic institution. First, votes are perfectly divisible and, hence, a vote buyer might end up having a non-integer number of votes. Second, the allocation of votes and money is directly affected by the market actions of all individuals. Finally, the term π can be interpreted as the market-clearing price and, hence, the explicit price-formation mechanism exhibits how individuals can affect prices of votes with their submitted (buying or selling) orders.
Strategic institution
A formal analysis of the game shows that for every fixed monetary amount β there is always an equilibrium with vote trading.
Proposition 1 For every β > 0 there exist an equilibrium with vote trading. Moreover, in an equilibrium with vote trading the probability of demanding votes increases with w i , whereas the probability of offering votes for sale decreases with w i .
Price-taking institution In the price-taking framework that we adopt votes are sold in exchange for money at a predetermined fixed price p, which is not affected by the market actions of vote traders. Individuals choose one of the following n + 1 actions: to demand one to n − 1 votes at price p; to offer their whole vote in exchange for p units of money; to neither offer nor demand votes.
In particular, individuals who wish to sell their vote receive an amount of money equal to the price p if their votes are actually sold, whereas individuals who wish to buy one or more votes pay the price p for each vote they actually purchase. As it will become obvious shortly, the probability that a buying or a selling order is executed depends on the actions of all vote traders. In any strategy profile with positive demand and supply of votes, the allocation rule is as follows: By conducting a formal analysis of the game we can also establish the following results about its equilibria.
Proposition 2 For every price p, all equilibria with vote trading are such that all individuals with intensity parameters w i < 2p offer their votes for sale and all individuals with intensity parameters
The crucial observation in the above proposition is that an individual with valuation w i = 2p
is exactly indifferent between demanding votes or offering her vote for sale (or refraining for trade) because the expected payoff from buying each additional vote is w i /2, which is equal to the price p at which a vote is sold. Moreover, it should be noted that although we do no adopt a competitive equilibrium setup (and hence there is no need for market clearing), it is always possible to find an equilibrium price that ex-ante clears the market for votes. 13 In particular, the equilibrium price that ex-ante clears the market is p * = F −1 ( n−1 n )/2. This is so because for any price p the expected supply of individual i is equal to F (2p) and the expected demand of individual i is equal to (n − 1)(1 − F (2p)). Thus, the expected total supply is equal to nF (2p) and the expected total demand is equal to n(n − 1)(1 − F (2p)). Market clearing requires nF (2p * ) = n(n − 1)(1 − F (2p * )), which yields F (2p
Given Propositions 1 and 2 we also state the following Hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3:
In an equilibrium with vote trading the probability of demanding votes increases with w i , whereas the probability of offering votes for sale decreases with w i .
Experiment

Experimental setup
The experiment took place at the Laboratory for Experimental Economics at the University of Cyprus (UCY LExEcon). A total of 90 subjects were recruited in 6 sessions, with 15 subjects in each session. Average total payment was approximately 13.38 euros and the experiment lasted about 80 minutes. 14 The experiment lasted for 50 rounds, prior to which there were 5 practice rounds that aimed at helping the subjects familiarize with the experimental environment. The experiment was designed on z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) .
In each of the 50 rounds, the 15 subjects of the session were grouped into communities of 5 members, with communities varying in each round. In the beginning of the round, each subject was endowed with 1 vote and 11 tokens and was randomly selected with equal probability to be a supporter of either the PURPLE or the BROWN group. Being a supporter of a group meant that a subject would receive additional tokens for each vote her preferred group received in the voting stage. 13 The use of an ex-ante market-clearing equilibrium price can also be found in Casella, Llorente-Saguer and Palfrey (2012), although a different equilibrium concept and dissimilar allocation rules are employed in their setup.
14 Final earnings were determined by the sum of earnings from the 50 rounds of the experiment's main part. Practice rounds were not taken into account for determining final earnings. Payment included 5 euros as participation fee. There were also two pilot sessions with 15 and 10 subjects respectively.
Moreover, each member of the community was randomly assigned with a valuation w that determined the additional tokens this member would receive for each additional vote that was cast in favor of her group during this round. w could take one of three different values, more specifically w ∈ {2, 10, 18} and each of the three values had the same probability of being selected for each subject. In each round, a subject knew the group she was supporting and her realization of w, but she did not know the preferred group and the valuations of the other members of their community.
Yet, it was made clear to the subjects that the process through which the preferred group and the valuation of each subject were selected was identical to their own, but the realized values had been chosen independently for each subject.
Prior to voting, subjects of a community were allowed to trade their votes for tokens and vice versa. We considered three different processes of vote trading, which correspond to the three treatments of our experiment and are explained below in detail. In all treatments, in each round a subject had to choose between (i) buying votes, (ii) selling her own vote, or (iii) neither selling nor buying votes.
The vote-trading stage was followed by a voting stage where the number of votes that a subject possessed were automatically counted for the group she supported. Note that votes were only traded and there was no possibility of abstention from voting, therefore during the voting stage a total of five votes were cast by the members of the community.
The earnings of a subject in a round were equal to the amount of tokens she had after the vote-trading stage plus the additional tokens that she received from the outcome of the elections (number of votes in favor of her preferred group multiplied by her individual valuation w). After each round, subjects could see the number of votes that were cast in favor of their group and their individual earnings. In addition to these, they could also see some information regarding the outcome of trading that depended on the specific features of each treatment.
We ran two sessions for each treatment, using different sequences of realized values for the members of the communities, the valuations and the preferences over groups. Yet, we used the same two sequences of realizations in the two sessions of all three treatments.
Treatments 1 and 2:
In these two treatments we employed the strategic framework, in the sense that subjects could submit fixed contributions in terms of tokens or votes and the additional votes or tokens, respectively, that a subject would receive depended on the total amount of these contributions from the members of the community. Treatments 1 and 2 differed only with respect to the value of the fixed amount of tokens β that the subjects who wished to buy votes had to submit.
In particular, β = 11 in Treatment 1 and β = 3 in Treatment 2.
15 As explained earlier, in cases of vote trading, the submitted tokens were distributed equally among the subjects who decided to sell their votes and the offered votes were distributed equally among the subjects who decided to submit β tokens. In cases of no vote trading, the submitted tokens/votes were returned to their original owners.
Treatment 3:
In this treatment we consider the price-taking framework, in which votes can be bought in exchange for tokens at a predetermined price p. We consider three distinct prices, p ∈ {9, 11, 13}, that appear in mixed order to the participants in the course of the 50 rounds.
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Hence, there was no uncertainty about the price of a vote, since vote traders were not able to influence the price with their market actions, unlike the previous treatments. Individuals who chose to buy, were also able to choose the maximum number of votes they would be willing to buy, which could be any quantity in {1, 2, 3, 4}. for sale falls short of the number of votes requested by buyers, the computer randomly selects the buyers whose buying orders are executed, with the restriction that a buyer gets a second vote only 15 These parameters generate different theoretical predictions regarding subjects' behavior -we explain this in the beginning of the next section -and, hence, allow us to test not just the welfare implications of our formal analysis but also aspects of the equilibrium comparative statics. 16 In fact, Treatment 3 employs a within-subject design with three sub-treatments, the results of which will be presented separately when appropriate. 17 There was a total of 4 occurences of a subject receiving negative earnings in a round and no subject earned less than 1607 tokens over the course of 50 rounds. We refrained from imposing a no-bankrupcy rule at the round level in order to be in line with the theory and to avoid complicating further the decsion process of the subjects, given that bankrupcy was expected to occur very rarely anyway for our selection of parametes. Negative earnings over the course of 50 rounds was essentially impossible given that the final earnings were determined by the sum of earning in all rounds.
if all buyers get at least one vote.
Additional theoretical predictions
In the previous section, we described some general theoretical results that hold irrespective of the specific parameters used in the experiment. Now, given the choices we made for those parameters, there are some additional theoretical results that we can establish.
First, Treatments 1 and 2 differ only with respect to the fixed amount β a subject should submit in order to buy votes. Given that this amount is fixed for all subjects, buying votes is essentially more costly in Treatment 1 than in Treatment 2. This yields a natural prediction that the volume of vote trading should be higher in Treatment 1. More specifically, if we consider symmetric equilibria in pure strategies with trade, subjects with valuation w = 2 sell their votes in both treatments, subjects with valuation w = 18 buy votes in both treatments, whereas subjects with valuation w = 10 sell their votes in Treatment 1 and buy votes in Treatment 2. Note that, this equilibrium prediction suggests that all subjects engage in vote trading and, given that types are drawn from a uniform distribution on {2, 10, 18}, the probability that trade actually takes place is equal to
5 + ( Second, in Treatment 3, we consider three different prices, p ∈ {9, 11, 13}. Theoretically, assuming risk neutrality, price p = 9 would clear the market, as for this price subjects with valuations w ∈ {2, 10} would sell their votes and subjects with w = 18 would request to buy up to four votes.
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As in Treatments 1 and 2, the probability that trade actually takes place is about 0.84. For prices higher than p = 9, no valuation (of the three available ones) is sufficient to make a subject wanting to buy votes. Therefore, under risk neutrality, there would be no equilibrium with trade for p > 9.
However, there is good reason why one would expect trade to take place even for higher prices.
In order to understand this, it is crucial to observe that the expected benefit from buying a vote is w/2, as the obtained vote is equally likely to have been owned initially by a supporter of the same team as the buyer or by a supporter of the other team. Thus, if a subject is risk averse, she would be willing to sacrifice part of her expected profits in order to ensure that more votes would be cast in favor of her group, meaning that she would be willing to buy votes even at a price p > 9.
This tendency towards overbidding is well-documented in the experimental literature both on vote trading ( Nevertheless, independently of the exact preferences of the subjects, it is natural to expect that higher prices would decrease the demand of votes and the frequency in which vote trading takes place, and increase the supply of votes; while it remains ambiguous at which price the market is expected to clear.
Hypothesis 6:
In Treatment 3, as the price p increases, the average supply of votes increases, the average demand decreases and the frequency of trade taking place decreases.
Experimental results
Trade, efficiency, and dispersion of benefits
Our theoretical framework suggests that irrespective of the exact trading institution vote trading is expected to take place and to be welfare improving for the society (Hypotheses 1 and 2). Our experimental results provide strong evidence in favor of these arguments.
Result 1: Vote trading takes place in more than 80% of the rounds of each treatment.
Result 1, as presented in Figure 1 is descriptive and highlights the high frequency of vote trading that emerges. Note that, in some rounds trade might not take place because of the realization of valuations in this particular round, despite the fact that some subjects might be willing to participate in it. For instance, if all subjects were drawn to have a low (resp. high) valuation w = 2 (resp. w = 18) then it is more likely that there would be no interest in buying (resp. selling) votes.
Theoretically, this would be expected to occur in approximately 14% of the rounds in Treatments 1 and 2 and in Treatment 3 for p = 9, which is roughly equal to the fraction of cases in which no trade took place. Interestingly, in Treatment 3, for p = 11 and p = 13, we would expect no trade to take place at all, which is much different from what we observe. In Treatment 3 overall we have a similarly high frequency of trading, which is slightly increasing in price (Figure 2 ). This result is due to the fact that the "empirical" market-clearing price seems to be much closer to p = 13 rather than to p = 9 (i.e., the theoretical market-clearing price). 19 This suggests that the supply:
a) is at most as large as the demand for every price level, and b) is increasing in price. Since trade occurs more often when supply is higher -conditional, of course, on the demand not being lower than the supply -, the mildly positive relationship between the frequency of trade occurrence and price seems to be a natural consequence of the subjects' excessive desire to buy votes.
Nevertheless, it is important to notice that the subjects very rarely end up to the no-trade equilibrium, despite this always being a theoretical possibility. Broadly speaking, these first results show that our general theoretical approach to vote trading in power-sharing systems produces relevant predictions, at least as far as the frequency of trade taking place is concerned.
Result 2a:
The average individual payoff increases in the presence of vote trading, in all treatments. Figure 3 shows the average difference in individual profit per round (i.e., observed individual profits minus the profits that the individual would get if vote trading were not allowed) both considering the whole sample (left panel of Figure 3 ) and when excluding the cases in which trade did not take place (right panel of Figure 3 ). The positive effect of vote trading is obvious even visually, despite the fact that in the left panel of Figure 3 the two profits are by construction equal 19 We elaborate on this in the end of the current section. for about 18% of the rounds in which trade did not take place. Nevertheless, both t-test and
Wilcoxon signed rank test reject even at the 1% level the hypothesis that the per round average profit observed in the data is equal to the per round average profit that the subjects would get without vote trading. Obviously, the result is reinforced even further if one rules out the rounds in which trade did not take place.
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Observe that the expected profits of an individual of type w are equal to 3w + 11 when vote trading is not allowed, and that the second part of the sum does not depend on the collective choice. Hence, vote trading increases on average the part of individual payoffs that depend on the election's outcome by more than 3% (average payoff of 30 without vote trading and above 31 with vote trading) when all rounds are taken into account, and by slightly more than this when we focus on rounds in which vote trading actually took place. This is probably the most important empirical result, as it provides support in favor of the welfare improving properties of vote trading in power-sharing systems. It should be noted that the result does not only hold at aggregate level over all rounds of each treatment, but similar results can be obtained for the average welfare of a community, as well as the individual payoffs over the So far, the welfare analysis focused on aggregate welfare of the society, irrespective of the individual characteristics of the subjects. However, as we present here, the benefits from vote trading are not distributed equally among subjects with different valuations. Figure 4 shows the difference in average profit observed in the data with what the subjects would get in the absence of trade.
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We observe that subjects with low valuations are the main and consistent beneficiaries from trading, whereas subjects with intermediate and high valuations, seem not to be greatly affected in most cases. This leads to two important observations: First, trading leads to a dispersion of benefits, as the subjects that do not care much about the outcome of the election can profit significantly by selling their votes. Second, the details of the trading institution need to be addressed with caution. For instance, while in Treatment 1 subjects with high valuation do not gain from vote trading, in Treatment 2 they look like benefiting from it. What is the driving force behind these diverse findings? We argue that trading institutions that impose constraints on prices -explicitly or implicitly -and, hence, do not allow them to become very large, help agents with high valuation gain from vote trading too. For instance, by focusing on Treatment 3 we observe that agents with high valuation demand votes even at very high prices, which has a detrimental effect on their welfare (see Figure 5 ). As far as agents with intermediate valuations are concerned, in theory, they should be the least affected in Treatments 1 and 2. This is broadly confirmed, as in Figure 4 the difference of their payoffs is shown to be about zero. In Treatment 3, however, the difference in their payoffs is increasing in the price: for p = 9 they lose significantly from trade, for p = 11 they are indifferent, whereas for p = 13 they might be gaining. The former happens because for p = 9 they often try to buy votes, although it gives them a lower expected profit than selling and the latter happens because for p = 13 they sell their votes and make substantial profits given that there is still enough demand by subjects with high valuations. Overall, we find a positive aggregate effect of vote trading on individual welfare, and that this positive effect can also extend to each separate valuation type only when the trading mechanism pushes prices towards low levels. Hence, our experimental results provide a conditional validation of our Hypothesis 2b.
Results related to individual valuations and treatments
We subsequently move to more specific questions that are more closely related to the particularities of our experimental design, but which still help us better understand various aspects of the effects of vote trading on electoral outcomes.
Result 3:
The frequency of choosing a vote-selling (resp. vote-buying) option decreases (resp. increases) as individual valuation increases, across all treatments.
This result is straightforward and, largely, expected but is presented for completeness and in order to obtain a round understanding of the exact shares of cases in which individual behavior was close to the equilibrium prediction (see Figure 6 ). The fact that a subject must invest a higher amount of her initial wealth to acquire new votes in Treatment 1 (β = 11) compared to Treatment 2 (β = 3) seems to suggest that selling votes is unambiguously more attractive in Treatment 1 than in Treatment 2. This is not accurate, though, because the described direct effect of a change in β discards the indirect effect of a changing number of vote sellers and vote buyers on prices. Indeed, an increase (resp. decrease) in the number of vote sellers (resp. vote buyers) exhibits a negative effect on prices, hence reducing the incentive for anyone to sell her vote. havior is due to a horizontal change of behavior that is more or less common across all valuations, or due to a significant alteration of behavior of a particular type of subjects. Our theoretical analysis predicts that the latter should be the case, as the equilibrium behavior is expected to change from Treatment 1 to Treatment 2 only for the subjects with valuation w = 10, who in the former case are expected to sell, whereas in the latter are expected to buy (Hypothesis 5).
Result 5: Subjects with valuation w = 10 sell (resp. buy) their votes more (resp. less) often in Treatment 1 than in Treatment 2. prominently vote buyers. We also perform t-tests that reject at 1% that frequencies of buying (resp. selling) are equal among Treatments 1 and 2 for subjects with valuations w = 10. Nevertheless, it should be noted that a large fraction of subjects with valuation w = 10 choose to abstain from trading in both treatments. Moreover, we also find higher tendency towards buying (resp. lower towards selling) in Treatment 2 for subjects with the other two valuations, despite the fact that the theory does not predict any change in their behavior. Nevertheless, the observed differences are in the expected direction, given that the expected gain from selling a vote is lower in Treatment 2.
Result 6: In Treatment 3, as the price p increases, the average supply of votes increases and the average demand decreases.
We find evidence in favor of Hypothesis 6, both at the individual and the group level. In fact, we find that the market for votes tends to clear for p = 13, which is much higher than the theoretical prediction of p = 9. The results are summarized in Figure 7 . This justifies further the increasing trend in the frequency of trade that was observed in Figure 2 . Interestingly, though, this tendency towards overpaying for votes is detrimental for the welfare of the individuals who do that and, as a consequence, it also affects negatively the aggregate welfare. Therefore, it reinforces the view that vote-trading institutions, if established, should be designed with caution in order to prevent theoretically unexpected behavior that can harm collective welfare. 
Conclusion
In this paper we study vote trading before elections in power-sharing systems and we argue, by using both theory and results from a lab experiment, that allowing for such an activity can lead to welfare improvements. Our experimental data show that the increase in welfare is statistically significant across all considered models of trade. Apart from welfare, the experiments allow us to explore the extent to which the actual behavior in committees corresponds to other interesting outcomes of our theory, and to pin down potential caveats and limitations. Indeed, the observed volume of traded votes, demands and supplies reacted in the predicted manner when parameters of the trading environment change. Moreover, again in line with the theory, we observe that more moderate voters benefit substantially from vote trading whereas those who care a lot about the outcome of the elections have minor or no gains. Hence, our study mitigates any concerns that vote trading may harm individuals who have little interest about the election's result. Perhaps, more importantly, our experiments identified risks that the theoretical analysis did not: vote-trading institutions should keep prices relatively low in order for no type of voter to experience systematic losses in payoffs.
Of course, we still need to explore a number of alternative directions that could further enhance our understanding of vote markets. In the current article, we study two simple trading institutions that feature many desirable properties but, certainly, they are not the only ones that could be used in contexts of applied interest. Hence, a key extension is to consider alternative market environments.
Another interesting way to go forward would have been to extend our -both theoretical and laboratory -analysis to additional decision rules. The current approach considers elections between two candidates like most relevant studies; yet, it offers completely different results by considering an alternative electoral system. Therefore, further investigations related to other applicable decision rules (e.g., systems of disproportional representation), for which the impact of vote trading on collective welfare is not obvious, would be of great interest.
Proof of Theorem 1
(i) First, let us state that no trade is always an equilibrium, as choosing is a best response of a player when all other players are expected to choose . In the no-trade equilibrium the expected utility of player i ∈ N is Eu i ( ) = w i (
) + e
In any equilibrium with vote trading, there is a positive measure of player types who choose to demand votes and a positive measure of player types who choose to offer their votes for sale.
For a player who chooses to trade the expected utility from demanding or offering votes has to be at least as high as the expected utility from choosing . The expected utility of player i ∈ N from choosing is independent of the exact number of vote buyers and vote sellers and is given by
) + e, which is equal to her expected utility in the no-trade equilibrium. Therefore, any equilibrium with vote trading assigns to every player of every type at least as high expected utility as the no-trade equilibrium.
(ii) We provide examples of such vote-trading institutions in subsection 3.1.
Proof of Proposition 1
The existence of an equilibrium with vote trading is a direct extension of Proposition 2 in Xefteris and Ziros (2017), where it is proven that for fixed monetary bids equal to one (β = 1) there exists a unique full-trade equilibrium (that is, an equilibrium in which nobody refrains form vote trading)
for any admissible F . The arguments used for that result can be easily extended to prove that equilibria with vote trading exist for any β > 0.
For the second part of the proposition, we argue that in any equilibrium with trade a probability measure z s > 0 of types offer their votes and a probability measure z b > 0 of types demand votes.
Let us denote with x i = s the action "offer vote" and with x i = b the action "demand votes".
The expected utility of a player i ∈ N with intensity parameter w i when offering her vote is , given that the extra votes allocated to a vote buyer are h > 0.
Finally, the expected utility of a player i ∈ N with intensity parameter w i when choosing is given by Eu i ( ) = w i (
) + e.
We observe that all of the above expected utilities are linear functions of the intensity parameter w i , for which we can establish that: 0 ≤ w i <ŵ (that is, the probability of offering votes is equal to one) and Eu i (b) > {Eu i ( ), Eu i (s)} for w i >ŵ (that is, the probability of demanding votes is equal to one), and
(ii) there are two thresholds w (at which Eu i (s) = Eu i ( )), w (at which Eu i (b) = Eu i ( )) with w > w , such that Eu i (s) > {Eu i ( ), Eu i (b)} for 0 ≤ w i < w (that is, the probability of offering votes is equal to one), Eu i ( ) > {Eu i (s), Eu i (b)} for w < w i < w (that is, the probability of choosing is equal to one) and Eu i (b) > {Eu i (s), Eu i ( )} for w i > w (that is, the probability of demanding votes is equal to one).
Proof of Proposition 2
When an individual chooses to sell (resp. buy) a vote, the expected loss (resp. increase) in the total number of votes of her preferred party is equal to 1/2. Hence, an individual offers her vote for sale if the price is high enough to compensate for the loss in expected payoff due to the lower number of votes for her preferred party, that is p > w i /2 or w i < 2p. Similarly, an individual demands an additional vote if the price is small enough so as to make profitable the increase in expected payoff due to the higher number of votes for her preferred party, that is p < w i /2 or w i > 2p. Moreover, an individual with intensity parameter w i > 2p finds it profitable to acquire as many votes as possible and hence she demands the votes of the other n − 1 individuals.
